FBI and Ohio Law Enforcement

CENTER FOR BIOETHICAL REFORM, INC.,
MARK HARRINGTON, QUENTIN PATCH, and DALE HENDEL,

Plaintiffs,

CITY OF SPRINGBORO, a municipal entity, JEFFREY KRUITHOFF, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police/Director of Safety, Springboro Police Department, City of Springboro, TIM PARKER, detective, Springboro Police Department, City of Springboro, in his individual capacity, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, a municipal entity, DAVE VORE, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff, Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, CLEARCREEK TOWNSHIP, a municipal entity, PETER J. HERDT, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police, Clearcreek Township Police Department, JEFF PIPER, police officer, Clearcreek Township Police Department, in his individual capacity, JOHN DOE-1, a fictitious name, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), individually and in his official capacity, JOHN and JANE DOES 2 through 13, fictitious names, in their individual capacities as law enforcement officerdagents with either the Springboro Police Department, City of Springboro, Clearcreek Township Police Department, or the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and though their undersigned attorneys, bring this First Amended Complaint against the above-named Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office, and in support therefore allege the following upon information and belief:

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

1. This is a case asserting the fimdamental constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, who are pro-life advocates who engage in lawful expressive activity in Ohio and elsewhere in order to protest abortion and promote respect for all human life. It is a civil rights action brought pursuant to the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 8 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the acts, policies, practices, andlor customs of Defendants.
2. Plaintiffs seeks a declaration that Defendants deprived them of their clearly established constitutional rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 8 1983, a permanent i n j ~ c t i o ~ enjoining Defendants from preventing Plantiffs fiom engaging in their lawful, expressive pro-life activity, and a judgment awarding nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages for the harm caused by Defendants and for Defendants’ reckless, wanton, intentional, and outrageous conduct. Plaintiffs also seek an award of reasonable costs of litigation, including attorneys’ fees and expenses. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
   
3. This action arises under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1346.
4. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. $5 2201 and 2202, by Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by 5 U.S.C. tj 702, and by the general legal and equitable powers of this Court.
5. Plaintiffs claim for damages is made pursuant to the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. tj 1983. Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief 2 regarding costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, is authorized by 42 U.S.C. 8 1988 and 28 U.S.C. 5 2412.
6. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 8 1391(b) & (e) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district. Pursuant to S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 82.1, venue in the Dayton location of the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio is proper because one or more defendants reside in Montgomery County, Ohio, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in Montgomery County, Ohio.PLAINTIFFS
7. Plaintiff Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. (“CBR’), is a pro-life, California- based, non-profit org~zation. It is a 501(c)(3) organization that is incorporated under the laws of California. CBR was established in 1990 as a non-profit public policy and advocacy group to promote prenatal justice and the right to life for the unborn, the disabled, the infirm, the aged, and all vulnerable peoples through education and the development of innovative educational programs. One such educational program is the Reproductive Choice Campaign (“RCC”). The RCC consists of large, colorful pictures depicting graphic images of first-term aborted fetuses displayed on the sides of box-body style trucks that are owned by CBR and operated by CBR employees and volunteers. Each displayed picture is accurately captioned as to age, in weeks since fertilization. Above each picture is also captioned the word “Choice.” The purpose of this educational program is to expose as many people as possible to the reality of “Choice,” a term that is at the heart of the abortion controversy. The RCC demonstrates to onlookers that “Choice” is the killing of innocent human life, and not some sterile, innocuous term. CBR employees and volunteers drive these trucks along the streets and highways of major cities and 3 towns throughout the United States, including the streets and highways of cities and towns in Ohio.
8. Plaintiff Mark Harrington is an adult resident of Ohio and a citizen of the United States. Plaintiff Harrington is the executive director of the Center for Bio-Ethical Reform Midwest, the Ohio-based affiliate of Plaintiff CBR. As the Midwest executive director, Plaintiff Harrington directs and participates in the activities of CBR, including the activities related to the RCC, throughout the Midwest region of the United States, including Ohio. On or about June 10, 2002, Plaintiff Harrington was driving one of the RCC trucks on the streets and highways of Ohio.
9. Plaintiff Quentin Patch is an adult resident of Ohio, a citizen of the United States, and a CBR volunteer. As part of his volunteer work, Plaintiff Patch would often drive the RCC trucks in Ohio and elsewhere. On or about June 10,2002, Plaintiff Patch was driving one of the RCC trucks on the streets and highways of Ohio.
10. Plaintiff Dale Henkel is an adult resident of Ohio, a citizen of the United States, and a CBR volunteer. As part of his volunteer work, Plaintiff Henkel would assist with the RCC project, including driving an escort vehicle owned by CBR that would accompany the RCC trucks during their travels. On or about June 10, 2002, Plaintiff Henkel was accompanying the RCC trucks in an escort vehicle as the trucks traveled the streets and highways of Ohio.
    DEVENDANTS
11. Defendant City of Springboro is a municipal entity organized and existing under the laws of the State of Ohio. At all relevant times, it employed the City of Springboro police officers, including Defendant Jeffrey Kruithoff, the Chief of Police and Director of Safety, Defendant Tim Parker, a detective, and certain Doe Defendants, who are unknown at this time.
12. Defendant Jeffiey Kruithoff is the Chief of Police for the Springboro Police Department and the Director of Safety in the City of Springboro, Ohio. Defendant Knrithoff is responsible for enforcing the laws in the City of Springboro, and he is responsible for adopting rules and regulations, setting and determining policy, and overseeing the operations of the Springboro Police Department and its employees, including Defendant Parker and certain Defendant Doe police officers, who are unknown at this time. Defendant b i t h o f f is responsible for the acts, policies, practices, andlor customs of the Springboro Police Department and its employees. At all relevant times, Defendant Kruithoff was an agent, servant, and/or employee of Defendant City of Springboro, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. tj 1983. Defendant Kruithoff is sued individually and in his official capacity.
13. Defendant Tim Parker is a detective with the Springboro Police Department in the City of Springboro, Ohio. At all relevant times, Defendant Parker was an agent, servant, and/or employee of the Springboro Police Department, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. fj 1983. Defendant Parker is sued in his individual capacity.
14. Defendant Montgomery County is a municipal entity organized and existing under the laws of the State of Ohio. At all relevant times, it employed the law enforcement officers of the Montgomery County Sheriffs Department, including Defendant Dave Vore, the Sheriff, and certain Doe Defendants, who are unknown at this time.
15. Defendant Dave Vore is the Sheriff for the Montgomery County Sheriffs Department, Montgomery County, Ohio. Defendant Vore is responsible for enforcing the laws in Montgomery County, and he is responsible for adopting rules and regulations, setting and determining policy, and overseeing the operations of the Montgomery County Sheriff s Department and its employees, including certain Defendant Doe law enforcement officers, who are unknown at this time. Defendant Vore is responsible for the acts, policies, practices, and/or customs of the Montgome~ County Sheriffs Department and its employees. At all relevant times, Defendant Vore was an agent, servant, and/or employee of Defendant Montgomery County, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. 5 1983. Defendant Vore is sued individually and in his official capacity.
16. Defendant Clearcreek Township is a municipal entity organized and existing under the laws of the State of Ohio. At all relevant times, it employed the Clearcreek Township police officers, including Defendant Peter J. Herdt, the Chief of Police, Defendant Jeff Piper, and certain Doe Defendants, who are unknown at this time.
17. Defendant Peter J. Herdt is the Chief of Police for the Clearcreek Township Police Department in Clearcreek Township, Ohio. Defendant Herdt is responsible for enforcing the laws in Clearcreek Township, and he is responsible for adopting rules and regulations, setting and determining policy, and overseeing the operations of the Clearcreek Township Police Department and its employees, including Defendant Piper and certain Defendant Doe police officers, who are unknown at this time, Defendant Herdt is responsible for the acts, policies, practices, and/or customs of the Clearcreek Township Police Department and its employees. At all relevant times, Defendant Herdt was an agent, servant, and/or employee of Defendant Clearcreek Township, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. 8 1983. Defendant Herdt is sued individually and in his official capacity.
18. Defendant Jeff Piper is a police officer with the Clearcreek Township Police Department. At all relevant times, Defendant Piper was an agent, servant, and/or employee of the Clearcreek Township Police Department, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. 6 1983. Defendant Piper is sued in his individual capacity.
19. Defendant John Doe-1 is an agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). At all relevant times, Defendant John Doe-1 was an agent, servant, and/or employee of the FBI, acting under color of state law and/or federal authority. Defendant John Doe-1 is sued individually and in his official capacity.
20. Defendants John and Jane Does 2 through 13, fictitious narnes of persons unknown at this time, are state law enforcement officers who work for various police and sheriff departments in Ohio, including the Springboro Police Department, the Montgomery County Sheriffs Department, and the Clearcreek Township Police Department. At all relevant times, Defendants John and Jane Does 2 through 13 were agents, servants, and/or employees of state law enforcement agencies, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. 5 1983. Defendants John and Jane Does 2 through 1 3 are sued in their individual capacities.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
21. On or about June 10, 2002, Plaintiffs were traveling the public streets and highways of Ohio in the RCC trucks, which displayed graphic images of aborted babies.
22. Plaintiffs were driving the trucks on June 10, 2002, as part of CBR’s RCC campaign. The purpose of the RCC campaign is to express CBR’s pro-life message to as many viewers as possible. Plaintiffs Harrington and Patch were each driving one of the RCC trucks, and Plaintiff Henkel was driving the escort vehicle, a Ford Crown Victoria sedan, Altogether, three vehicles were involved in the project on this day.
23. Plaintiffs commenced their pro-life speech activity on June 10, 2002, at approximately 7:OO a.m. They traveled in the RCC trucks on the public streets and highways of several counties in the Dayton, Ohio area. They displayed their pro-life message on the public streets and highways for more than eight hours without incident.
24. At ap~roximately 4:OO p.m., Plaintiffs decided to cease their pro-life activity for the day. It had been a long and hot afternoon driving in the vehicles; the temperature and humidity were particularly high that day.
25. Plaintiffs drove to the private residence of two pro-life volunteers who offered to let Plaintiffs park their vehicles on their property for the evening. Upon arriving at the residence, Plaintiffs saw that the driveway was long and winding with several low-hanging tree branches. Plaintiffs were concerned that the trucks might not be able to travel the driveway. As such, Plaintiffs pulled their vehicles to the side of the road so that they could take a closer look at the driveway to determine whether the trucks could safely make it to the residence.
26. While the trucks were pulled over, one Defendant from the Clearcreek Township Police Department arrived in a marked police cruiser. This Defendant observed the large, graphic pictures on the sides of the trucks, and he approached Plaintiff Patch, who was sitting in the driver’s seat of one of the RCC trucks. The Defendant asked Plaintiff Patch if they were lost or needed any assistance. Plaintiff Patch told the Defendant that they were part of a pro-life advocacy group called CBR, that they were just finishing their tour of several counties of the Dayton area with their pro-life project, and that they were trying to get down the driveway to park their vehicles for the evening. The Defendant departed the area without hrther investigation.
27. All three of CBR’s vehicles made it partially down the driveway. However, because of the obstructions, Plaintiff Harrington decided not to go any further and risk possible damage to the vehicles. While the trucks were in the driveway, Plaintiffs covered the graphic signs, as they typically do when they are finished for the day. They planned to drive the RCC trucks to their alternate overnight ocation, a local church parking lot. The pastor of the church had given them pe~ission to do so.
28. While the trucks were backing out onto the two-lane road, several police cruisers driven by some of the Defendants arrived. Plaintiff Henkel was guiding the trucks for safety reasons as they backed out onto the street; his escort vehicle was parked at the mouth of the driveway.
29. After the first truck driven by Plaintiff Patch pulled out, approximately two police cruisers driven by some of the Defendants followed Plaintiff Patch down the road. After Plaintiff Harrington pulled out, a police cruiser driven by one Defendant followed him down the road. Moments after Plaintiff Harrington pulled out and started down the road, approximately five more police cruisers driven by some of the Defendants pulled up to the driveway and blocked Plaintiff Henkel’ s vehicle, preventing him fkom leaving. One Defendant told Plaintiff Henkel to stay away from his vehicle and requested to search Plaintiff Henkel’s vehicle. Believing that he had no alternative because of the show of authority of the strong law enforcement presence and the fact that the Defendants were blocking his vehicle, Plaintiff Henkel told the Defendant that “he had nothing to hide.” The Defendant searched Plaintiff Henkel’s vehicle, including his personal items that were in the vehicle. The Defendant also photographed some of the items he was searching, including the vehicle.
30. Throughout his detention and the search of his personal items, Plaintiff Henkel kept asking the Defendants who were present to explain to him why he was being detained. Plaintiff Henkel also clearly expressed to these Defendants that he wanted to leave. The Defendants only responses were “Stay over there-stay away from the car,” “stay put,” “stay there,” or “don’t go anywhere.” One Defendant stood over Plaintiff Henkel as Plaintiff Henkel was made to sit under a tree while certain Defendants searched his vehicle.
31. Because of the extreme heat of the day, Plaintiff Henkel asked one of the Defendants if he could have a drink of water from the water bottle he had with his personal items in his car. The Defendants waited for more than thirty minutes before allowing Plaintiff Henkel to have a drink of water.
32. Approximately twelve to fifteen law enforcement officers were present with Plaintiff Henkel. At no time during Plaintiff Henkel’s detention did any Defendant explain to him why he was being held. After more than three hours of being detained outside in the heat of the day, the Defendants finally let Plaintiff Henkel leave. Throughout Plaintiff Henkel’ s detention, many curious neighbors and other passersby stopped to see what Defendants were doing, causing extreme embarrassment for Plaintiff Henkel. At the end of this ordeal, Defendants did not cite or otherwise charge Plaintiff Henkel with having committed any violation of the law. Plaintiff Henkel did not receive so much as a traffic citation from any of the Defendants.
33. While Plaintiff Henkel was being detained, approximately four police cruisers driven by some of the Defendants put on their flashing lights and pulled over the RCC trucks driven by Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington. The Defendants detained Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington approximately a half a mile down the road from where Plaintiff Henkel was being detained.
34. Upon seeing the police cruisers with their lights flashing, Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington immediately pulled over. They were pulled over into a residential subdivision.
35. Approximately six or seven police cruisers driven by some of the Defendants arrived at the location where Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington were detained. Police cruisers were parked to the front and rear of the RCC trucks, preventing Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington from being able to leave.
36. Moments after pulling them over, several Defendants exited their vehicles, unlatched their firearms, and maneuvered in a tactical fashion toward the Plaintiffs, who were sitting in the driver seats of the RCC trucks.
37. Plaintiff Patch raised his hands over his head and slowly exited his vehicle. Plaintiff Patch was extremely nervous; he feared that certain Defendants would draw and possibly fire their weapons at him.
38. Plaintiff Harrington exited his vehicle and was immediately interrogated by one Defendant. Both Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington immediately provided Defendants with their driver’s licenses. Plaintiff Patch started feeling ill; he was light-headed and believed he was going to faint. As a result, Plaintiff Patch sat down on the side of the road.
39. Plaintiff Harrington explained to Defendants what they were doing. Defendants requested to inspect the trucks. Believing that he had no alternative because of the show of authority of the strong law enforcement presence and the fact that the Defendants were blocking his trucks, Plaintiff Harrington told them that they could. When one Defendant started going through Plaintiff Harrington’s personal items he had in a small bag in the truck, Plaintiff Harrington asked the Defendant if that was necessary. The Defendant curtly responded, “You already gave your permission” or words to that effect, and proceeded with the search.
40. Throughout the detention and search, Plaintiff Harrington kept asking the Defendants who were present to explain to him why they were being detained. One Defendant responded, “We don’t know the answer to that, our supervisors will let you know,” or words to that effect. Plaintiff Harrington also expressed to the Defendants that he and Plaintiff Patch wanted to leave. Plaintiff Harrington told the Defendants to either charge them with an offense or let them go. Plaintiff Patch also told the Defendants in a loud, clear, and unambiguous manner that they were being detained against their will and that they wanted to leave. Defendants’ responded by simply telling the Plaintiffs that they were not Eree to go and that they had to wait. Defendants indicated that they were waiting for fbrther instructions from their supervisors, who appeared to be directing their actions. Defendants’ supervisors included Defendants Kruithoff, Vore, and Herdt.
41. During the search of the trucks, which were empty except for a few hand-held pro-life signs, Defendants photographed the signs as well as the inside and outside of the trucks. Defendants also made Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington display the large photographs that were attached to the sides of the RCC trucks so they could photo~aph those signs as well. This required Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington to roll up the six heavy tarps that covered the large signs on the sides of the two trucks, a difficult and physically exhausting task, particularly during the heat of the day. During the search, Defendants photographed and measured each of the pro-life signs. During this search and the continued detention, many people from nearby residences came out to watch what the Defendants were doing to Plaintiffs. This was extremely embarrassing and damaging to Plaintiffs, particularly since it clearly appeared to the onlookers that these pro-life advocates were breaking the law and were being treated as dangerous criminals.
42. After a couple of hours had passed, Defendant John Doe-1 arrived, Defendant John Doe-1 approached Plaintiff Harrington, got right up in Plaintiff Harrington’s face, and was 12 extremely hostile to Plaintiff Harrington. When Plaintiff Harrington asked Defendant John Doe- 1 to explain why they were being held, Defendant John Doe-1 responded by stating, “You only answer me when I speak to you,” or words to that effect. Defendant John Doe-1 then demanded that Plaintiff Harrington give him his driver’s license. Plaintiff Harrington obeyed this command, surrendered his license, and then asked again why he and the other Plaintiffs were being detained. Defendant John Doe- 1 grabbed Plaintiff Harrington by the shoulder and forcibly led him behind one of the trucks. Plaintiff Harrington told Plaintiff Patch to take a picture of this, and Defendant John Doe-1 grabbed the camera from Plaintiff Patch’s hand. Plaintiff Harrington felt threatened by Defendant John Doe- 1 ‘s actions and believed that Defendant John Doe-1 was going to assault him. Defendant John Doe-1 proceeded to interrogate Plaintiff Harrington about CBR’s activities. At one point, Defendant John Doe-1 stated, “You may not be going anywhere if you don’t cooperate,” or words to that effect.
43. After the Defendants subjected Plaintiffs Patch and Harrington to more than three hours of detention and harassment, Defendants allowed them to leave. At the end of this ordeal, Defendants did not cite or otherwise charge Plaintiffs Patch or Harrington with having committed any violation of the law. Plaintiffs did not receive so much as a traffic citation from any of the Defendants. During the detention, one Defendant stated, “This is pretty gross. I can’t believe you do this stuff’ and “You should find another way to get your message out,” or words to that effect, referring to Plaintiffs’ pro-life activity.
44. Defendants have a policy, practice, and/or custom of “profiling” pro-life demonstrators, such as Plaintiffs, as criminals. This policy, practice, andlor custom was the moving force and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as set forth in this First Amended Complaint.
45. Throughout the detention, Plaintiffs did not believe that they were free to leave. Indeed, Defendants told Plaintiffs that they could not leave, and Defendants positioned their vehicles so as to make it impossible for Plaintiffs to leave. Furthermore, Plaintiffs had no option but to subject their vehicles and personal property to a thorough and intrusive search by the Defendants. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs suffered fear, humiliation, shame, indignity, worry, embarrassment, loss of reputation, and emotional and physical distress.
46. Defendants’ conduct was done in a reckless, wanton, intentional, and outrageous manner, and with deliberate indifference to and disregard for the clearly established constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (FREEDOM OF SPEECH)
47. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all above paragraphs.
48. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, engaged in under the color of state law and/or federal authority, Defendants have f constitutionally deprived Plaintiffs of their freedom of speech rights guaranteed to them under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, in that Defendants, through their acts, policies, practices, and/or customs, unlawfully and unreasonably detained and searched Plaintiffs because of their pro-life speech activity.
49. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of Plaintiffs’ rights, Plaintiffs have suffered direct and irreparable injury, and they are entitled to damages.SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (FREEDOM OF SPEECH CONSPIRACY)
50. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all above paragraphs.
51. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, and policies, practices, and/or customs, engaged in under the color of state law andor federal authority, Defendants have conspired to unconstitutionally deprive Plaintiffs of their right to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. tj 1983, in that Defendants agreed to and engaged in overt acts that did unlawfully and unreasonably detain Plaintiffs because of their pro-life speech activities.
52. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of Plaintiffs’ rights, Plaintiffs have suffered direct and irreparable injury, and they are entitled to damages.CLAIM FOR RELIEF (UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE)
53. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all above paragraphs.
54. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, and policies, practices, and/or customs, engaged in under the color of state law and/or federal authority, Defendants unconstitutionally searched Plaintiffs’ vehicles and personal property and unconstitutionally seized Plaintiffs’ persons, vehicles, and other property, without a warrant, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a crime had been, was being, or would be committed, and without valid consent, and thus deprived Plaintiffs of their rights to be free of unreasonable police searches and seizures, to be fiee of warrantless searches and seizures, and to be free of searches and seizures without probable cause, which are guaranteed to them under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 5 1983.
55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of Plaintiffs’ rights, Plaintiffs have suffered direct and irreparable injury, and they are entitled to damages.FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZU NSPIRACU)
56. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all above paragraphs.
57. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, and policies, practices, andlor customs, engaged in under the color of state law and/or federal authority, Defendants have conspired to unconstitutionally deprive Plaintiffs of their rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, in that Defendants agreed and engaged in overt acts to unlawfblly stop and seize Plaintiffs and to stop, search, and seize Plaintiffs’ vehicles and personal property without a warrant, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a crime had been, was being, or would be committed, and without valid consent, and thus deprived Plaintiffs of their rights to be free of unreasonable police searches and seizures, to be free of warrantless searches and seizures, and to be free of searches and seizures without probable cause which are guaranteed to them under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 5 1983.
58. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of Plaintiffs’ rights, Plaintiffs have suffered direct and irreparable injury, and they are entitled to damages.PRAYER FOR RELIEFWHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court for the following: A) to perrnanently enjoin Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office from formulating, adopting, implementing, and/or enforcing any act, policy, practice, custom, law, and/or decision having the effect of unlawFully preventing Plaintiffs from engaging in peaceful, constitutionally protected pro-life 16 activity, including displaying signs depicting images of aborted babies, fetuses, or human embryos on the sides of box-body style trucks, in the traditional public fora of Ohio and elsewhere; to permanently enjoin Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in B) office from formulating, adopting, implementing, and/or enforcing any act, policy, practice, custom, law, and/or decision having the effect of unlawfully searching and seizing the property of Plaintiffs without probable cause, without a warrant, and without valid consent, including searching and seizing Plaintiff CBR’ s vehicles that display signs depicting images of aborted babies, fetuses, or human embryos; to enter judgment declaring that Defendants’ acts, practices, policies, and/or customs were unlawful and unconstitutional as set forth in this First Amended Complaint; to award Plaintiffs nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages; C) D) E) to award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. tj 1988,28 U.S.C. tj 2412, and other applicable law; and F) to grant such other and further relief as this Court should find just and proper. Respecthlly submitted this /746 day of March, 2003